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Trust-management: a form of distributed access control
based on policy statements made by multiple principals.
A key aspect is delegation: transfer of limited authority on
some resources to other principals.
Usually, this is done by means of credentials.
Decisions are made according to the identity of the
resource requester.
PROBLEM: when resource owner and requester are unknown
to each other, such a form of access control does not work.
Must shift the focus on the certiﬁcates it demonstrably holds.
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AN APPROACH: RT [LI, MITCHELL, WINSBOROUGH@IEEE-SSP02]
Trust management + rˆ ole-based access control
Inspired by trust-management languages such as SPKI/SDSI
Includes basic operations to perform complex forms of
delegation
A family of increasingly powerful languages, RT0 being the
basic form.
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An auditor can inspect an enterprise ENT only if is authorised
by the UK government: ENT.AUDITOR ← UK.AUDITOR;
An audithor is authorised if is a member of a government
recognised society: UK.AUDITOR ← UK.AUTHSOC.MEMBER;
Auditing societies must be legally registered and ‘fair’:
UK.AUTHSOC ← UK.LEGALSOC u UK.FAIRSOC.
Assume BSOC is both legally registered and ‘fair’ for UK law:
UK.LEGALSOC ← BSOC and UK.FAIRSOC ← BSOC;
and that B belongs to BSOC: BSOC.MEMBER ← B;
From this, we want to infer that B can inspect ENT.
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Four kinds of RT0-credential:
1 A.r ← B states that principal B belongs to the rˆ ole r governed
by principal A;
2 A.r ← B.s states that all members of rˆ ole s governed by B
also belong to rˆ ole r governed by A;
3 A.r ← B.s u C.t states that rˆ ole r governed by A contains all
the members of both B’s rˆ ole s and of C’s rˆ ole t;
4 A.r ← B.s.t states that rˆ ole r governed by A contains all the
members of C’s rˆ ole t, for every C belonging to B’s rˆ ole s.
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RT0 semantics: ﬁxpoint construction; equivalently, translation into
logic programs and minimal Herbrand models.
A more ‘operational’ ﬂavour: certiﬁcate inference from a (ﬁnite)
set of credentials P.
c ∈ P
P  c
P  A.r ← B.s P  B.s ← C
P  A.r ← C
P  A.r ← B.s.t P  B.s ← C P  C.t ← D
P  A.r ← D
P  A.r ← B.s u C.t P  B.s ← D P  C.t ← D
P  A.r ← D
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Derive a credential for B as a UK AUDITOR:
P  UK.LEGALSOC ← BS P  UK.FAIRSOC ← BS
P  UK.AUTHSOC ← UK.LEGALSOC u UK.FAIRSOC
P  UK.AUTHSOC ← BS
P  BS.MEMBER ← B P  UK.AUDITOR ← UK.AUTHSOC.MEMBER
P  UK.AUDITOR ← B
We can then derive a credential authorising B to inspect ENT:
P  ENT.AUDITOR ← UK.AUDITOR P  UK.AUDITOR ← B
P  ENT.AUDITOR ← B
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Extend RT0 by adding boolean guards and time validity:
permissions often hold only for speciﬁc periods of time;
can be issued/revoked according to the context.
Example (auditing, revised)
BSOC becomes legal only after its registration at time τ:
UK.LEGALSOC ← BSOC in [τ,+∞)
UK’s fairness certiﬁcates are valid only for a period of time υ1,
and B is a member of BSOC for a ﬁxed period υ2:
UK.FAIRSOC ← BSOC in υ1 , BSOC.MEMBER ← B in υ2
B can inspect ENT if he is authorised and is not one of ENT’s
employees:
if B ∈ UK.AUDITOR ∧ B / ∈ ENT.EMPLOYEE then ENT.AUDITOR ← B
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 B.s u C.t
RT0 CREDENTIAL: c ::= A.r ← e
GUARDS: g ::= tt
  B ∈ A.r
  B / ∈ A.r
  g1 ∧ g2












 υ1 ∪ υ2

 υ1 ∩ υ2

 υ1 \ υ2
CDCS: χ ::= if g then c in υ
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Given a (ﬁnite) set of CDCs ℵ, adapt the inference system to
derive new certiﬁcates.
Judgements take the form
ℵ `τ c
and mean that c can be inferred, at time τ, from ℵ.
This entails that ℵ satisﬁes
all the positive guards of the CDCs used in the inference;
none of their negative guards.
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i Bi ∈ Ai.ri ∧
^
j B0
j / ∈ A0
j.r0
j then c in υ ∈ ℵ
∀i .ℵ `τ Ai.ri ← Bi ∀j .ℵ 0τ A0
j.r0
j ← B0
j τ ∈ υ
ℵ `τ c
To use a CDC
all its positive guards must be inferrable,
none of its negative guards must be inferrable, and
the CDC must be valid at the inference time τ.
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The other rules are adapted mutatis mutandis from those for RT0:
Rules
ℵ `τ A.r ← B.s ℵ `τ B.s ← C
ℵ `τ A.r ← C
ℵ `τ A.r ← B.s.t ℵ `τ B.s ← C ℵ `τ C.t ← D
ℵ `τ A.r ← D
ℵ `τ A.r ← B.s u C.t ℵ `τ B.s ← D ℵ `τ C.t ← D
ℵ `τ A.r ← D
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PROBLEM: the inference system has negative premises,
which has the potential to undermine its well-foundedness
SOLUTION: use the stable model construction (from LP ,
adapted to inference systems [BOL, GROOTE]) to assign
meaning to the inference system whenever possible;
Following the stable model construction, we also adapt to
CDCs the two existing semantics (set-theoretic and logic
programming-based) of RT0 [MITCHELL ET AL].
The three semantics coincide.
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CDCs require full knowledge of the context where the
evaluation takes place, i.e.,
the exact time of evaluation, and
all the CDCs available (to ensure soundness in the presence
of negative premises).
In large-scale distributed systems these pieces of information are
hardly available (due to asynchrony and the co-existence of
multiple administrative entities).
We enhance the inference system for CDCs to also derive
constraints on the execution context that validate a given
inference.
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Characterise the instants when a given inference holds.
if
^








j then c in υ ∈ ℵ







ℵ (υ ∩ ∩i υi) \ ∪ j υj c
ℵ υ1 A.r ← B.s ℵ υ2 B.s ← C
ℵ υ1 ∩ υ2 A.r ← C
ℵ υ1 A.r ← B.s.t ℵ υ2 B.s ← C ℵ υ3 D.t ← D
ℵ υ1 ∩ υ2 ∩ υ3 A.r ← D
ℵ υ1 A.r ← B.s u C.t ℵ υ2 B.s ← D ℵ υ3 C.t ← D
ℵ υ1 ∩ υ2 ∩ υ3 A.r ← D
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The same credential can be inferred in different ways, with
different time validity; the following rule takes into account this
possibility:
ℵ υ1 c ℵ υ2 c
ℵ υ1 ∪υ2 c
If such a rule is used whenever possible throughout the inference
of ℵ υ c, then we can prove that
ℵ `τ c if and only if τ ∈ υ and ℵ has a semantics at time τ.
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Characterise necessary and conﬂicting context credentials for
an inference to hold.
We aim at an inference system with judgements of the form
ℵ φ
τ c
meaning that c is derivable from ℵ at time τ in any execution
context that satisﬁes φ.
φ is a propositional formula over the atoms B ∈ A.r, i.e.
φ ::= tt
  B ∈ A.r
  ¬φ
  φ1 ∧ φ2
  φ1 ∨ φ2
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Such propositional formulae characterise sets of CDCs:
Deﬁnition
ℵ τ tt iff ℵ has a semantics at time τ
ℵ τ B ∈ A.r iff B ∈ JℵKτ(A.r)
ℵ τ ¬φ iff ℵ 2τ φ
ℵ τ φ1 ∧ φ2 iff ℵ τ φ1 and ℵ τ φ2
ℵ τ φ1 ∨ φ2 iff ℵ τ φ1 or ℵ τ φ2
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Straightforward adaptions of the previous rules:
if
^








j then c in υ ∈ ℵ
τ ∈ υ ∀i . ℵ 
φi
τ Ai.ri ← Bi
ℵ 







τ A.r ← B.s ℵ 
φ2
τ B.s ← C
ℵ 
φ1 ∧ φ2
τ A.r ← C
ℵ 
φ1
τ A.r ← B.s.t ℵ 
φ2
τ B.s ← C ℵ 
φ3
τ C.t ← D
ℵ 
φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ φ3
τ A.r ← D
ℵ 
φ1
τ A.r ← B.s u C.t ℵ 
φ2
τ B.s ← D ℵ 
φ3
τ C.t ← D
ℵ 
φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ φ3
τ A.r ← D
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A rule like
ℵ φ1




is sound, but not strictly necessary.
An additional set of axioms is needed for the inference system
work properly:
ℵ B∈A.r
τ A.r ← B
Theorem (soundness and completeness)
Let ℵ0 be such that ℵ ∪ ℵ0 τ φ; then, ℵ 
φ
τ c iff ℵ ∪ ℵ0 `τ c.
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Expressive variant of RT0 with enhanced inference system;
Set-theoretic and logic-programming semantics for CDCs;
Use of stable model theory to handle divergence arising
from the presence of negative premises;
Inference of constraints on the execution environment; these
are equivalent to abductive constraint LP (cf. the paper)
Future Work
Allow CDCs with richer kinds of premises; e.g.,
if A.r ⊆ B.s then c in υ or if A.r ∩ B.s = ∅ then c in υ
Allow negative forms of delegations; e.g.,
A.r ← B.s u ¬C.t
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